Abstract--Vulnerability of a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to total ionizing dose and displacement damage is studied. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, linear bipolar devices, and hybrid devices.
B. Test Methods -Proton
Proton damage tests were performed on biased devices. Functionality and parametrics were measured either continually during irradiation (in-situ) or after step irradiations (for example: every 10krad(Si), or every 1x10 10 protons/cm 2 ). Table I lists the proton damage test facilities and energies used on the devices. Table II . Abbreviations and conventions are listed in Table  III . Please note that these test results can depend on operational conditions. Complete test reports are available online at http://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov [3] . IV. TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION As in our past workshop compendia of GSFC test results, each DUT has a detailed test report available online at http://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov [3] describing in further detail, test method, TID conditions/parameters, test results, and graphs of data.
A. STPSC1006D/ ST Microelectronics/Power Diode
The ST Microelectronics power diode STPSC1006D was tested for TID tolerance using a Co60 source. The power diodes are robust against TID up to highest tested level of 9 Mrad(Si). The reverse current showed slight increase from approximately 120 V to 250 V. The forward current-voltage and capacitance-voltage characteristics remain unchanged after irradiation. Thus there were minimal degradation to the diode's physical and electrical properties, including the Schottky contact, doping concentration, and series resistance. 
B. 4G NAND Flash/ Samsung
TID results for the Samsung 4G NAND Flash are presented in Fig. 2 . Twenty five samples were tested, five each from five different LDCs. Parts were exposed in a Co-60 source at the rate of 12 rad(Si)/sec. Nominal bias for these parts is 3.3 V, but testing was done at nominal VDD+10% (per TM 1019.8), or 3.6 V. Parts were biased , but not actively exercised during exposures. There were no errors in any part from any LDC at less than 100 krad(Si), which is sufficient for many NASA missions. At higher doses, there were some errors, which could be reset, however, the parts worked properly after being reset, until functional failure occurred, at 150-225 krad(Si), depending on LDC. The differences between LDCs were not large but measurable indicating one source of uncertainty when dealing with unhardened commercial technology. When functional failure occurred, it was due to the erase function failing in all cases. Although these parts represent unhardened commercial technology, we note that their radiation tolerance is dramatically better than the nearest commercial equivalent parts from ten or fifteen years ago, making them promising candidates for most NASA missions. 
C. TL750L05CDR/ Texas Instruments/Voltage Regulator
The TL750L05CDR is a commercial low-dropout voltage regulator manufactured by Texas Instruments tested for extreme enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS) as research. Detailed description of the results for this part and other parts in the ELDRS study can be found in [5] . Fig. 3 shows average output voltage (from 4 parts at each dose rate) vs. TID. We observe distinct dose rate dependence for functional failures of the Vout. The initial failures occur after 40, 20, and 10 krad(Si) for the 5, 1, and 0.5 mrad(Si)/s parts, respectively. In the 5 mrad(Si)/s case, one part each failed after 40 and 50 krad(Si). Two parts failed after 80 krad(Si). In the 1 mrad(Si)/s case, two parts failed after 20 krad(Si), while two parts remain functional. In the 0.5 mrad(Si)/s case, two parts failed after 10 krad(Si), while two parts remain functional. The device failures are characterized by the functional failure of the output voltage. The parts failed abruptly, without gradual degradation to V out or any other measured parameter. 
V. SUMMARY
We have presented data from recent TID and protoninduced damage tests on a variety of primarily commercial devices. It is the authors' recommendation that this data be used with caution. We also highly recommend lot and application specific testing be performed on any suspect or commercial device.
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